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Executive Summary
For this report, the Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) investigated six potential revenue
generating measures, as requested by Portland Parks and Recreation (PP&R). This research includes an
analysis of the revenue potential for each tax, the impacts of compression in property taxes, and an
assessment of tax incidence.
Three of the funding options investigated are forms of property tax: a temporary local option tax, a
permanent special district tax, and a general bond obligation. Using 2017 property tax data, NERC built a
model that simulates these tax increases for each tax lot in Portland. The growth of Assessed Value (AV)
and Real Market Value (RMV) over time are accounted for in revenue projections, which are made from
FY2020-21 to FY2024-25. PP&R provided the scenarios that determined the target value to raise
independently from any NERC analysis. The rates described in the report are the rates necessary to meet
these targets.
Our model estimates a $0.92 (per $1,000 AV) temporary local option property tax would generate roughly
$50 million for PP&R in FY 2020-21. This equates to a $76.60 increase (per $100,000 AV) for a typical
household. By gradually increasing the rate to $1.19 over a five-year horizon, these revenues can reach
up to $68 million by FY 2024-25. For comparison, this would change the average household tax bill
increase from $76.60 to $92.10 (per $100,000 AV).
In order to raise the same $50 million, the city would need to levy a permanent special district tax of $0.80
(per $1,000 AV). This fee would increase the typical Portland household tax bill by $67.80 (per $100,000
AV) – about $9 less than the local option. However, adding a special district tax affects the funding of
other local tax levies more than adding a local option tax, due to tax compression (a term that describes
the mandatory limit on property tax rates in Oregon, as set forth in 1990’s Ballot Measure 5). Compression
“squeezes” revenues from both local option and special district taxes, reducing them below expected
levels calculated using solely tax rates and property values.
The final property tax revenue option examined is a general obligation bond. This type of property tax
does not have compression effects, but does entail the restriction that revenues can only be used for
capital purchases (i.e. cannot be put toward operating costs). Because of this caveat, we estimate a bond
rate of $0.74 (per $1,000 AV) is required to raise a slightly lower target of $48 million in revenue. Adding
this bond is estimated to increase a typical Portland household’s property tax by $74.30 (per $100,000
AV).
The other three funding options analyzed are consumer goods taxes: a transient lodging tax, a cell phone
tax, and a prepared food and beverage tax. All three taxes are estimated for 2018.
Portland currently has three local transient lodging taxes; two levied at the city level and one collected by
Multnomah County (and passed through to Metro). These taxes are paid by travelers renting short-term
lodging (hotels, Airbnb, private campsites, etc.) and collected by the operator of the accommodation.
Considered simultaneously, these taxes result in a 15.3% rate on lodging in Portland, comparable to that
observed in cities across the Pacific Northwest. The City of Portland estimates that raising this tax by 1%
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would have generated an additional $7 million in 2018.1 However, this new revenue is limited in what it
may be used for – Oregon statutes mandate that no more than 30% of local transient lodging taxes can
be set aside for city or county services.2
With the implementation of a 5% cell phone tax on the wireless industry, our analysis estimates annual
revenues for 2018 between $6.98 and $7.25 million. We arrive at these estimates with three different
methodologies. The first approach uses wireless gross receipts data for the nation as a whole from the
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), proportionately adjusted to match Portland
population levels. The next two methods use data from the City of Portland’s 2017 Tax on Wireless
Communication Services. We use 2016 estimates for wireless revenues in both Multnomah County and
the city of Eugene and then scale these values by national wireless revenue growth rates to arrive at 2018
revenue estimates for both areas.
Lastly, our estimates find that a 5% food and beverage tax in Portland could have generated between
$72.9 and $96.1 million in revenue in 2018. The low estimate is derived using 2018 gross national
restaurant sales from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) survey, scaled to Portland levels, with a 5% rate applied. If the restaurant business is more
intensive in Portland than the U.S. as a whole, this may lead to an underestimate. Higher estimates are
calculated using revenues from Ashland’s Food and Beverage Tax and the Portland Business License Tax
for businesses associated with food and beverage sales.
What follows in this report is a detailed account of how these estimated are obtained, what the funding
potential is for each option, how the phenomenon of compression will alter revenues for property taxes,
and how the tax burden will be distributed in the local economy for each of the revenue generating
measures described above.

Property Taxes
Data and Methodology
Three property tax funding options are considered: i) a temporary local option tax; ii) a permanent special
district tax; and iii) a general bond obligation. We use 2017 property tax data, which includes Maximum
Assessed Value (MAV) and Real Market Value (RMV) at property level. MAV and RMV are adjusted to
account for their potential change over time. Their assumed growth rates over the period of five years
(Table 1) are consistent with the ones used in revenue projections by other levies3. Our model also
requires the current tax rates of all local options and permanent special districts-- these are provided by
Multnomah County, and used in all property tax estimates for this report.
Table 1: Assumptions used in property tax simulation
Assumptions

FY 2017-18

FY 2018-19

FY 2019-20

FY 2020-21

FY 2021-22

FY 2022-23

FY 2023-24

FY 2024-25

RMV Growth

13.8%

7.5%

5.0%

4.0%

4.0%

4.0%

4.0%

4.0%

4.8%

3.3%

3.5%

3.5%

3.3%

3.2%

3.2%

3.0%

AV Growth

1

Estimates provided by City Economist Josh Harwood
OregonLegislature.gov. (2019). 2017 ORS 320.350. Retrieved from
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors320.html
3
As provided by City Economist Josh Harwood.
2
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The calculation is straightforward in the case of the general obligation bond: the tax rate is determined
simply by dividing the target revenue ($50 million) by total MAV for each property. However, this method
cannot be transferred when considering local option and permanent special district taxes because of past
ballot measures limiting property taxes and resulting in the phenomenon of property tax compression.
Compression is an important characteristic of Oregon’s property tax system. Oregon Ballot Measure 5,
passed in November of 1990, requires that, for every property, total property taxes dedicated to general
government are limited to $10 for every $1,000 RMV. When that limit is exceeded, the total tax rate must
remain the same, so taxes are reduced in a specified order (described below), meaning that an increase
in one tax levy results in decreased revenue for other tax levies. This decrease in revenue is termed
compression, and it occurs at the property level. Temporary local options and permanent special district
taxes are subject to the compression, while general bond obligations are exempt from it, meaning that
they are not included in the tax required to fall under the 10% limit (hence the simplicity of the
calculation). According to the priority of taxes in compression, local option taxes are compressed first, and
if there are multiple local options, all of them are compressed proportionately. The compression of
permanent special district taxes starts only after all local option taxes are zero, and if there are multiple
special district taxes, proportionate compression is also applied.
This tax compression has a number of implications. First, an increase in the special district or local option
tax rate (or both) does not necessarily coincide with a proportional rise in government revenue. Actual
revenue generated is generally lower than total tax extended. Second, since the compression occurs at an
individual property level, using aggregate data is likely to produce an inaccurate estimate of the tax rate
required to meet a target revenue. Third, due to the proportionate compression mechanism, raising
revenue through a specific PP&R levy will necessarily result in lower revenues for other existing tax levies.
Due to the compression order, which levy has a reduction and by how much, depends on the type of tax
(i.e. whether it is a permanent rate or a temporary local option) adopted by PP&R in relation to other
existing property tax levies in place.
More specifically, a PP&R local option will result in a decrease in local option revenues collected by the
other levies, but will not affect their permanent special district taxes, while a PP&R permanent special
district tax will reduce all of them. Consequently, to reach a given revenue goal, the local option requires
a higher tax rate, but impacts the revenue of other levies less. The permanent special district draws more
revenue from other levies, thereby requiring a lower tax rate. To this end, it is clear that using the local
option to fund the PP&R will cause, on average, a larger increase in household tax bills than using the
permanent special district. The bond obligation is not compressed and does not affect the revenue of
other levies; and its effect on household tax bills depends on the scenario and state of compression of the
household.
The Fire & Police Disability & Retirement Fund (FPDR) adds an additional dimension of complexity. FPDR
has a target revenue, which is raised by a permanent special district tax. Although the tax is subject to
compression, the levy can increase its tax rate until the target is met. The target revenue of FPDR over the
next five years is provided in Table 2.4 Due to compression, adding the PP&R permanent tax necessarily
4

For the simulation, we use the required FPDR revenue without accounting for discounts or delinquencies. As a
result, our estimated FPDR rates without PP&R is marginally lower than those of the FPDR department.
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causes the FPDR revenue to be reduced. Therefore, for each fiscal year, a new FPDR rate must be
estimated so that both departments can simultaneously achieve their target revenues. This issue does not
arise in cases of the PP&R local option due to the order of compression, or for the general bond obligation,
which is exempt from compression.
Table 2: Target FPDR Revenue
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23

Assumptions
FPDR Target Revenue
($ million)

163.5

182.8

195.0

FY 2023-24

FY 2024-25

210.1

224.1

Given all of the complications analyzed above, the simulation strategy for the case of the PP&R local
option differs slightly from the case of the PP&R permanent special district.
To determine the PP&R local option rate, we follow a simple algorithm. For each property, we first
calculate the tax limit equal to 1% of its RMV, and select an initial rate. Then we calculate the total
property tax extended on that lot, and compare it to the tax limit. If the extended tax does not exceed the
limit, then the levied PP&R tax revenue is equal to the amount extended. If the extended tax is higher
than the limit, however, compression is modeled for as follows.
First, we compare the permanent special district tax revenue to the limit. If the former is less than the
latter, the total local option revenue will be equal to their difference. If the former is larger than or equal
to the latter, the local option revenue is set to zero, and the permanent special district tax revenue is set
equal to the limit. After accounting for compression, the PP&R revenue can be calculated by multiplying
the PP&R local option rate with the after-compression total local option revenue, and then divided by the
total local option rate. The total PP&R revenue is the sum of revenues across all properties. This total
revenue is then compared to the target revenue. A lower rate is applied if it exceeds the target, and a
higher rate is applied if it is lower than the target, until the two are sufficiently close to each other.
For the permanent special district tax, the compression process is similar, but not identical. Because the
imposition of the PP&R permanent special district affects the FPDR revenue due to compression, some
modifications to the revenue calculation are warranted. First, based on the target revenues provided by
FPDR, we recover the FPDR tax rate and revenue at property level before the PP&R permanent rate is
introduced, using a procedure similar to the calculation of the PP&R local option rate. Then, we subtract
the original FPDR rate from the total permanent special district rate to obtain the total rate of all fixed
components. Finally, we estimate a permanent special district rate sufficient to raise revenue equal to the
total target revenue of PP&R and FPDR. The estimation procedure is similar to the one used to calculate
the FPDR rate, with the only exception being that the total permanent rate now equals the total rate of
all fixed components (i.e. excluding the original FPDR) plus the total rate of PP&R and FPDR so that FPDR
is not double-counted. The PP&R individual rate can be calculated by multiplying the obtained rate by
PP&R’s share of the PP&R and FPDR total revenue.
The compression loss amounts to the difference between the total tax extended and the total tax levied.
To calculate the revenue losses of other departments, we compare their revenues before and after the
PP&R tax is added, holding the target FPDR revenue unchanged. The revenue of each local option tax is
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calculated by multiplying its tax rate by the total local option tax levied, and then dividing by the total rate
of all local option taxes. A similar process is also used to calculate the permanent special district revenue.
PP&R requested NERC calculate the rates under two different scenarios (called Scenarios 2 and 3 since
the first scenario—not modeled—involves no change in revenue, and thus no change in tax). These
scenarios have increasing revenue goals over a five-year period, with Scenario 2 incorporating little to no
expansion of PP&R’s activities, and Scenario 3 incorporating some capital and operating expansion.
NERC’s estimates of rates, compression impacts, etc. are presented with regards to these scenarios.
Notably, the goals for the bond is lower because the bond cannot be used to fund operating cost. Finally,
the difference between “goal” and “generated” is about 0.1% or less; essentially
measurement/approximation error.

Revenue Impacts
Table 3 presents the estimated mill rates required for a local option tax to reach the target revenues over
the period of five years. For example, a $0. 92 (per $1,000 AV) temporary local option property tax would
generate roughly $50 million in FY 2020-21. By gradually increasing the rate to $1.19 over a five-year
horizon, these revenues can reach up to $68 million by FY 2024-25. In order to raise the same $50 million,
the city would need to levy a smaller special district tax of $0.80 (per $1,000 AV), as shown in Table 4,
which provides revenues and necessary mill rates for the special district tax scenario.
The final property tax revenue option examined is a general obligation bond (Table 5). This type of
property tax does not have compression effects; however, these funds can only be used for capital
purchases (i.e. cannot be put toward operating costs). Because of this caveat, we estimate a bond rate of
$0.74 (per $1000 AV) is required to raise a slightly lower target of $48 million in revenue.
PP&R requested NERC calculate the rates under two different scenarios (called Scenarios 2 and 3 since
the first scenario—not modeled—involves no change in revenue, and thus no change in tax). These
scenarios have increasing revenue goals over a five-year period, with Scenario 2 incorporating little to
no expansion of PP&R’s activities, and Scenario 3 incorporating some capital and operating expansion.
NERC’s estimates of rates, compression impacts, etc. are presented with regards to these scenarios.
Notably, the goals for the bond is lower because the bond cannot be used to fund operating cost. Finally,
the difference between “goal” and “generated” is about 0.1% or less, and just sort of
measure/approximation error5.

5

Estimates reported are rounded

Northwest Economic
Research Center

PORTLAND PARKS AND RECREATION: FUNDING AND FINANCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS

7

Table 3: Estimated Tax Rates and Revenues for a Local Option Tax
Year
Scenario 2
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2019-20
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24

Target Revenue
($ million)

Mill Rate
($ per $1,000 MAV)

50.1
54.5
58.3
63.0
68.3

0.923
0.979
1.015
1.064
1.118

119.3
126.2
132.6
140.0
148.2

2.375
2.440
2.474
2.517
2.573

Table 4: Estimated Rates of a PP&R Permanent Special District Tax
Year
Scenario 2
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25

Northwest Economic
Research Center

Target Revenue
($ million)

Mill Rate
($ per $1,000 MAV)

50.1
54.5
58.3
63.0
68.3

0.798
0.841
0.873
0.914
0.962

119.3
126.2
132.6
140.0
148.2

1.922
1.971
2.008
2.055
2.111
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Table 5: Estimated Rates of a PP&R Bond Obligation
Year
Scenario 2
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25

Target Revenue
($ million)

Mill Rate
($ per $1,000 MAV)

47.9
49.8
51.7
53.7
55.8

0.743
0.747
0.753
0.758
0.764

73.5
76.3
79.2
82.1
85.2

1.140
1.145
1.152
1.158
1.166

Compression Impacts
The property tax revenues cannot be stated without also discussing their impact on compression. In order
to remain below the state mandated threshold for property taxes, an increase in local option or
permanent special district property tax earmarked for PP&R would result in decreased revenue for other
city services. Due to the compression priority, the latter affects all of them while the former affects only
those that are funded by local option property taxes. As shown in Table 6, the difference in terms of
revenue loss to other agencies caused by the PP&R local option and the PP&R special district can be
substantial, approaching a factor of nine. The fact that FPDR revenue must be fixed further magnifies the
impact of the PP&R special district on other property taxes. As the bond obligation is exempt from the
compression, it has no effect on other agencies. Table 7 describes the reduction in revenue by levy under
both a local option and a permanent levy in the first year (FY 2020-21) compared to the FY 2019-20
revenue.
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FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
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Table 6: Reduction in revenue to other existing levies ($ million)
PP&R target revenue
Local Option
Special District
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5

50.1
54.5
58.3
63.0
68.3

-0.72
-0.79
-0.84
-0.90
-0.96

-6.38
-7.09
-7.52
-8.12
-8.68

Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5

119.3
126.2
132.6
140.0
148.2

-1.87
-2.01
-2.09
-2.20
-2.29

-17.13
-18.52
-19.30
-20.34
-21.25

Table 7: Reduction in revenue by levy (Local Options in Green, Permanent Levies in Orange)
Children's
Fund

Oregon
Historical
Society

Metro

City of
Portland

Port

Metro

East/west
soil

County

Urban
Renewal
Districts

Scenario 2

-2.4%

-1.9%

-1.9%

-

-

-

-

-

-

Scenario 3

-6.2%

-4.9%

-5.0%

-

-

-

-

-

-

Scenario 2

-4.2%

-3.3%

-3.4%

-0.4%

-0.5%

-0.5%

-0.6%

-0.6%

-0.7%

Scenario 3

-10.8%

-8.5%

-8.7%

-1.2%

-1.3%

-1.4%

-1.6%

-1.7%

-1.8%

Local

Permanent

Tax Incidence Analysis
Table 8 compares the effect of using the local option and the special district property tax on taxpayers. As
explained, since the local option tends to pull less revenue from other departments, a given target
revenue requires a higher mill rate, resulting in a larger increase to the homeowner’s tax bill on average
than the special district. For example, to raise $50 million by the PP&R local option, a typical homeowner
would have to pay an additional tax of $76.6 for every $100,000 of their house’s assessed value while the
owners of median value houses would have to pay $144.2 more. In the special district case, these figures
are only $67.8 and $127.7, respectively. For the bond obligation with slightly less revenue (i.e. $48 million),
they are $74.3 and $139.9, respectively (Table 9). As expected, the effect of the bond obligation should
be higher than that of the permanent special district case due to its compression exemption, but less than
that of the local option due to its lower revenue target.
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Table 8 Tax increases for homeowners by local option and special district tax
Local Option
Special District
Typical
Tax Bill
Typical
Tax Bill
Target
Median
Homeowner
Increase by
Homeowner
Increase by
Revenue
AV
Tax Bill
Median AV
Tax Bill
Median AV
($ million)
($1,000)
Increase
($)
Increase
($)
($ Per
($ Per
$100,000 AV)
$100,000 AV)

Scenario 2
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25

50.1
54.5
58.3
63.0
68.3

188.3
194.6
200.8
207.2
213.4

76.6
80.6
83.7
87.6
92.1

144.2
156.9
168.0
181.4
196.7

67.8
71.1
73.9
77.4
81.6

127.7
138.4
148.4
160.3
174.2

119.3
126.2
132.6
140.0
148.2

188.3
194.6
200.8
207.2
213.4

182.1
186.4
189.9
194.2
199.7

343.0
362.7
381.2
402.4
426.2

158.4
161.6
164.9
168.7
173.8

298.3
314.4
331.2
349.5
370.9

Table 9: Tax increases for homeowners by the bond obligation

Year

Scenario 2
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25
Scenario 3
FY 2020-21
FY 2021-22
FY 2022-23
FY 2023-24
FY 2024-25

Target Revenue
($ million)

Median AV
($1,000)

Typical
Homeowner Tax
Bill Increase
($ Per $100,000
AV)

47.9
49.8
51.7
53.7
55.8

188.3
194.6
200.8
207.2
213.4

74.3
74.7
75.3
75.8
76.4

139.9
145.4
151.1
157.0
163.0

73.5
76.3
79.2
82.1
85.2

188.3
194.6
200.8
207.2
213.4

114.0
114.5
115.2
115.8
116.6

214.6
222.8
231.3
239.9
248.8
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While they differ in their impact on taxpayers, all three measures are regressive: the local option and
permanent special districts are equally regressive, and bonds are the least regressive on average (it should
be emphasized that this finding is true on average, and that there are exceptions to this rule). Figures 3
and 4 illustrate the percent increase in taxes faced at different income levels, for the local option
tax/special district tax and bond obligation respectively. (Again, the local option tax and special district
tax have the same distribution in terms of percent increase by income level, hence the representation on
the same graph.)
Figure 3, on the next page, shows the spatial distribution by median income (top) and by estimated tax
bill (bottom). These maps suggest that, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, the wealthiest households do not
face the highest tax bills, and present this information geographically. The regressivity can be attributed
in part to compression, which caps the tax payments for some homes in wealthier areas.

Figure 1: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income level (for select areas) by Local Option
or Permanent Levy

$1.00 Local Option
5%

4%
y = -8E-08x + 0.0404
3%

2%

Census Tract with Median
Household Income of 20k,
would see (on average) a
3.8% increase in their tax bill

1%

Census Tract with Median
Household Income of 160k,
would see (on average) a 2%
increase in their tax bill

0%
$0

$20,000

$40,000

$60,000

$80,000 $100,000 $120,000 $140,000 $160,000 $180,000

Note: The results are for the case of imposing a $1.00 mill rate of local option. Use of a $1.00 permanent
special district would produce virtually the same result.
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Figure 2: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income (for select areas) by bond obligation

Note: The results are for the case of imposing a $1.00 mill rate of bond obligation
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Figure 3: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income levels by bond obligation
Spatial Distribution of households by their median households incomes

Spatial Distribution of households by Tax Bill

Source: Randy Morris, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies
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New Cell Phone Tax
Data and Methodology
In 1997, the City of Eugene adopted an ordinance requiring telecommunications companies to pay a 2%
business tax in order to fund future telecommunication-related projects.6 The tax is passed to consumers
on their monthly cell phone bill, and generated roughly $800,000 for the city in 2016. We consider a similar
tax for the City of Portland, which currently administers a negotiated fee on telecommunication services
but does not have an outright cell phone tax.
We arrive at these estimates using three different methodologies; the first employs national level data
from the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) 2019 Industry Survey. These wireless
gross receipts are then proportionately adjusted to match Portland population levels. After arriving at an
estimated value for total wireless revenue for Portland, we reduce the taxable revenue by 15%7 due to
devices and services that are not subject to the tax but are included in industry data. After applying the
5% tax rate, we then adjust the revenues further to account for internet access charges, which are nontaxable.
The next two methods use data from the City of Portland’s 2017 Tax on Wireless Communication Services.
We use this report’s 2016 estimates for wireless revenues in both Multnomah County and the City of
Eugene, and then scale these values by national wireless revenue growth rates to arrive at 2018 revenue
estimates for both areas. Once we have estimated total revenue, the methodologies for Multnomah
County and Eugene diverge: the county level uses a similar process to that described above with the
national CTIA data, but Eugene’s results are estimated using a “bottom-up” approach. First, 2018
estimates for revenue per capita are calculated, subsequently converted to Portland revenue per capita
using a multiplier, and finally aggregated to estimate wireless tax revenues for the city.

Revenue Impacts
With the implementation of a 5% tax, our analysis estimates annual wireless revenues for 2018 between
$6.98 and $7.25 million. Table 10 delineates these findings. Since cell phone rates do not depend on
income, cell phone taxes are regressive.
Table 10: 2018 Revenue Estimates from Portland Cell Phone Tax
Method

2018 Revenue

Extrapolated from CTIA National Data

$6,982,414

Extrapolated from Eugene Tax Revenue*

$7,138,334

Extrapolated from Multnomah County's Tax Revenue Collected*

$7,254,479

*Revenue extrapolated from 2018 national revenue growth

6

Eugene-or.gov (2004) City of Eugene Fact Sheet Fees and Taxes on Telecommunications Businesses. Retrieved
from https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2065/TelecomFeeFactSheet?bidId=
7
The 15% reduction of taxable revenues is taken from City of Portland’s 2017 Wireless Tax Analysis

Northwest Economic
Research Center

PORTLAND PARKS AND RECREATION: FUNDING AND FINANCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS

15

New Prepared Food and Beverage Tax
Data and Methodology
Another tax option analyzed is the prepared Food and Beverage Tax (FBT). Ashland, Oregon has had a 5%
FBT since 1993, projected to bring in nearly $3 million in revenue for the city in 2019. The Ashland FBT is
levied on all prepared food items served in a restaurant, excluding alcohol – this includes takeout, delivery
orders, grocery store deli items, coffee shops, caterers, and food carts.
We employ three methods to estimate the revenue potential for a Portland FBT. The first estimate is
derived using 2018 gross national restaurant sales, scaled to Portland levels with the 5% tax applied. It is
reasonable to assume this estimate represents a lower bound for the area, due to the city’s prevalent
“foodie” culture of fine dining. Higher estimates are calculated using revenues from Ashland’s Food and
Beverage Tax and the Portland Business License Tax for businesses associated with food and beverage
sales.
Beginning with Ashland’s FBT revenue estimates from the city’s 2017-19 Biennium Budget, we use a
simple population adjustment to translate these figures to Portland. In 2018 Ashland’s population was
roughly 20,700, representing 3.29% of the population in Portland (630,300). Scaling the Ashland revenues
up by this percentage, we estimate a similar FBT tax would generate roughly $90 million in revenue for
the city of Portland.
Lastly, we extrapolate Portland business revenues for businesses with NAICS codes associated with the
prepared food and beverage industry. With data from the Portland Revenue Bureau’s food and beverage
sales tax analysis, we adjust 2012 gross income for the industry using wage growth as a proxy. First, we
calculate wage growth between 2012 and 2018 using Food Service and Drinking Places data from Oregon
Employment Department. Once this growth is applied, we arrive at an estimated $1.92 billion in gross
income for Portland food and beverage industries. Finally, the 5% tax is applied to the industry’s aggregate
income, resulting in an estimated $96 million in government revenue.

Revenue Impacts
Our estimates, displayed in Table 11, find that a 5% FBT in Portland could have generated between $72.9
and $96.1 million in revenue in 2018. We note the higher estimates are likely closer to the true value since
there is a prevalent dining culture in Portland.
Method

Table 11: 2018 Revenue Estimates from Portland Food and Beverage Tax
2018 Revenue

Extrapolated from National Restaurant Association Data

$72,949,528

Extrapolated from Ashland's Tax Revenue Collected

$90,276,074

Extrapolated from Portland Business Revenue*

$96,118,835

*Portland Business Revenue extrapolated from 2012 using wage growth as a proxy

To gain some insight on how stable this revenue source could be, it’s helpful to examine the volatility of
Ashland’s FBT from 2008 to 2019. As shown in Figure 4, FBT revenues for the city have increased every
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year except 2009-2010 (this is unsurprising due to the Great Recession); however growth tends to
bounce from zero to positive values ranging between 10%-20%.
Figure 4: Ashland, OR Food and Beverage Tax (FBT), Annual Revenue, 2008-2019
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Figure 5 illustrates the percent of food eaten away versus at home broken down into income quintiles at
the national level. The data indicates that prepared food and beverages are a special type of good known
as a luxury good; this means that higher income individuals spend more of their income on these goods
than do their lower income counterparts. Unlike a normal good, when a flat tax is applied to a luxury good,
that tax is considered progressive. It is easy to see how this would be the case of a prototypical luxury
good such as a yacht or private airplane, but prepared food and beverages fall into the rather nebulous
zone between a normal and luxury good, since the difference in share of consumption between lower and
high-income individuals is small. Due to this nebulousness, NERC refers to a food and beverage tax as
“relatively progressive,” since it is more progressive than most of the other taxes discussed in the report.
Figure 5: Average Share of Total Real Consumption by Income Quintile (1984-2012)8
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8

Second-highest

Highest

Other lodging

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 1984-2012. Cleveland Federal Reserve.
Categories are determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and overlap relevant spending categories.
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Increase in Transient Lodging Tax
Revenue Impacts
Portland currently has three local transient lodging taxes; two levied at the city level and one collected by
Multnomah County (and passed through to Metro). These taxes are paid by travelers renting short-term
lodging (hotels, Airbnb, private campsites…etc.) and collected by the operator of the accommodation.
Combining these taxes, the rate in Portland is currently 15.3% which is similar to other lodging taxes in
cities across the Pacific Northwest. The City of Portland estimates that raising this tax 1% would generate
an additional $7 million.9 However, this new revenue is limited in what it may be used for – Oregon
statutes mandate that no more than 30% of local transient lodging taxes can be set aside for city or county
services.10 Other lodging (a Bureau of Labor Statistics category which includes hotels) is a luxury good
because spending as a proportion of income increases with income (see Figure 2).
Method

Table 12: Estimated Revenue from 1% Increase in Lodging Tax
2018 Revenue

City of Portland estimate for 1% increase

$7,000,000

Conclusion
This report explored six different tax options (or tax increases) for the purposes of increasing revenue for
Portland Parks and Recreation. Three of these options fall under the umbrella of property taxes and three
are goods taxes. Due to state limits on property taxes such tax increases warrant in-depth discussions
regarding the effects of compression which are provided above.
Of the three property tax options, a permanent special district tax is the least expensive for the typical
homeowner, however this option has the largest implications in terms of revenue loss for other local
levies. Temporary local option property taxes place a higher burden on taxpayers, with smaller
compression adjustments, while general obligation bonds cost taxpayers more still given the absence of
compression effects for this type of taxation.
Other than the prepared Food and Beverage Tax, the non-property tax revenue options have much lower
funding potential - both a 1% increase in transient lodging taxes as well as a 5% cell phone tax could raise
the city approximately $7 million. The revenue potential for FBT far outweigh the former options, with
the potential to bring in between $73-$96 million annually. While this option remains somewhat volatile,
historical data from Ashland shows net positive growth over the last decade.

9

Estimates provided by City Economist Josh Harwood
OregonLegislature.gov. (2019). 2017 ORS 320.350. Retrieved from
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors320.html
10
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Table 13: Summary of Conclusions
Tax

Rate

Potential
Revenue

Regressivity

Temporary Local Option Property
Tax

$0.923 (per $1000 AV)

$50 Million

Regressive

Permanent Special District Tax

$0.798 (per $1000 AV)

$50 Million

Regressive

General Obligation Bond

$0.743 (per $1000 AV)

$48 Million

Regressive
(but less than
Local Option
and Special
District)

Food and Beverage Tax

5% on individual prepared
food and beverage
consumers

$73-$96 Million

Relatively
Progressive

Transient Lodging Tax

1% increase

~$7 Million

Relatively
Progressive

Cell Phone Tax

5% on eligible cell phone
revenues (paid by
telecommunication
companies)

~$7 Million

Likely
Regressive
based on
exemptions
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Appendix: General Property Tax Increases
Table 14: General Increase in Temporary Local Option Property Tax Levy in FY 2020/21
Revenue Raised
($ million)

Reduction in revenue
to other agencies
($ million)

Tax Bill Increase
($ Per $100,000 AV)

Median Single Family
Property Tax Bill
Increase
($)

5.5
-0.07
8.5
15
11.1
-0.15
16.9
31
16.5
-0.23
25.3
46
22.0
-0.31
33.7
61
27.4
-0.39
42.0
77
32.8
-0.47
50.2
92
38.2
-0.55
58.4
107
43.6
-0.62
66.6
122
48.9
-0.70
74.7
136
54.2
-0.78
82.8
151
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the
growth of AV, is estimated to be equal to about $182,500.
Table 15: General Increase in Permanent Special District Tax Levy in FY 2020/21
Tax Increase
($ per $1,000 AV)

Revenue Raised
($ million)

Reduction in
revenue to other
agencies
($ million)

Tax Bill Increase
($ Per $100,000
AV)

Median Single
Family Property
Tax Bill Increase
($)

0.10
6.2
-0.72
8.5
15
0.20
12.4
-1.47
16.9
31
0.30
18.5
-2.23
25.3
46
0.40
24.7
-3.00
33.7
61
0.50
30.8
-3.79
42.0
77
0.60
37.0
-4.60
50.2
92
0.70
43.1
-5.42
58.4
107
0.80
49.2
-6.25
66.6
122
0.90
55.3
-7.10
74.7
136
1.00
61.3
-7.96
82.8
151
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the
growth of AV, is estimated to be equal to about $182,500.

Table 16: General Increase in Bond Obligation in FY 2020/21
Tax Increase
($ per $1,000 AV)

Revenue
Raised
($ million)

Reduction in
revenue to
other agencies
($ million)

Tax Bill Increase
($ Per $100,000
AV)

Median Single
Family Property
Tax Bill Increase
($)

0.10
6.4
10.0
18
0.20
12.9
20.0
37
0.30
19.3
30.0
55
0.40
25.8
40.0
73
0.50
32.2
50.0
91
0.60
38.7
60.0
110
0.70
45.1
70.0
128
0.80
51.6
80.0
146
0.90
58.0
90.0
164
1.00
64.5
100.0
183
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the
growth of AV, is estimated to be equal to about $182,500.

